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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant-contestant appeals from a jury verdict entered 
against them in the contest of the Will of Mervin J. Russell. This 
court obtains jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-
2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
POINT I 
The trial court abused its discretion by requiring the 
parties to stipulate to the testimony of appellant's expert wit-
ness. The standard of review is prejudicial abuse of discretion. 
State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415 (Utah 1989). 
POINT II 
The Court erroneously applied the clear and convincing 
evidence standard of proof to the issue of undue influence in a 
Will. The standard of review is one of correctness giving no 
deference to the trial court's ruling. Mountain Fuel Supply v. 
Salt Lake Cityy 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Gene Russell contests the Will of Mervin J. 
Russell and related documents. The Honorable Scott Daniels 
presided over a jury trial In the Matter of the Estate of Mervin 
J. Russell on May 22-25, 1989. The jury verdict declared valid a 
Will dated November 9, 1983, and Cancellation of Antenuptial 
Agreement dated January 25, 1983. The jury verdict declared 
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invalid a quit-claim deed dated June 25, 1982f and Cancellation of 
Antenuptial Agreement dated August 14f 1982. Appellant-contestant 
Gene Russell filed a motion for a new trial on June 26f 1989, The 
motion was denied on March 5f 1990. The judgment was entered on 
March 7, 1990. Appellant-contestant filed a Notice of Appeal on 
April 6, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ada and Mervin Russell were married in January 1938f (T. 
442) and divorced in September of 1971 (T. 358). Mervin and Ada 
Russell are the parents of Will contestants Gene Russell and Helen 
Russell (T. 358). Mervin Russell, the decedent, married his second 
wife, Georgia Russell, on January 17, 1972 (T. 192). 
On January 11, 1972, Mervin and Georgia executed an 
antenuptial agreement (T. 192). Mervin1s attorney, Ed Skeen, 
prepared the antenuptial agreement (T. 303) and testified that its 
purpose was to prevent Mervin's children, Gene Russell and Helen 
Russell, from being deprived of longtime Russell family property 
and to keep Georgia's relatives from getting any interest in 
Mervin's property (T.304). 
The Russell family had been working the subject land for 
four generations (T. 359). The Russell family always planned that 
Gene would inherit the land (T. 359). When she was eight years 
old and again at 13, Mervin Russell told his daughter Helen that 
his land would someday be Gene's land (T. 160 and 162). 
Ada Russell, Mervin's ex-wife, and Mervin often discussed 
Gene's inheritance of the Russell land (T. 446). Gene Russell 
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testified that it was "understood" in the family that he would 
inherit the property (T. 369). Mervin reiterated his desire to 
pass on his land to Gene when Gene adopted a son in 1966 (T. 163 
and 361). Gene and Mervin worked as partners on the ranch until 
1973 when Mervin took another job (T. 373). 
In the summer of 1971f Ada and Mervin Russell discussed 
Gene's inheritance for the last time when they talked about an 
antenuptial agreement upon Mervin1s remarriage (T. 446). 
Again, immediately before Mervin and Georgia were 
married, Mervin had separate conversations with both Gene and Helen 
(T. 166 and 362). Mervin told them he asked Georgia to sign an 
antenuptial agreement so that Gene and Helen would inherit all his 
assets (T. 166 and 363). Georgia Russell testified that it was Ada 
and not Mervin who wanted an antenuptial agreement (T. 194). In 
late December 1971, Mervin confided to Helen that he was worried 
Georgia may be marrying him for his property (T. 167). 
Georgia and Mervin married in January 1972. In April 
1972, Mervin told Helen that he made a big mistake and never should 
have married Georgia (T. 181). 
In 1975, Mervin sold all of his sheep to pay off a P.C.A. 
note (T. 376). From 1972 through 1976, Mervin worked for Getty Oil 
and seldom participated in the ranch operation (T. 367). However, 
in 1977 or 1978, Mervin told Gene he was going to take over ranch 
operations (T. 369). 
In March of 1976, the ranch was in financial difficulty 
and Mervin was going to sell some cows to pay the bills (T. 679 
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and 691). Gene's ex-wife Geneil borrowed $5,100.00 from her father 
and loaned it to Mervin so that he did not have to sell any cows 
(T. 681). Georgia and Mervin repaid the loan in March 1977 (T. 
681). However, Georgia Russell testified that she knew nothing 
about the loan until Helen told Mervin that Geneil had borrowed 
money from her father to use in the ranch operation (T. Russell 
25). Georgia also testified that Mervin was not aware of this (T. 
Russell 25). 
In January 1982, Mervin underwent two operations for a 
ruptured appendix and a bladder obstruction (T. 394). In April 
1982, Mervin returned to LDS Hospital for a fever of unknown 
origins (T. 97). 
On May 14, 1982, Mervin and Georgia met with their 
attorney, Ed Skeen (T. 314). Georgia Russell testified that Mervin 
gave Skeen instructions about drafting a quit-claim deed, a Will 
and an agreement canceling the antenuptial agreement (T. 239). 
However, Mr. Skeen testified that if a simple will had been 
requested that day, he would have drafted it while the client 
waited (T. 318-319). 
Georgia Russell testified that on May 14th, Mervin asked 
Skeen to put everything in Georgia's name and that he wanted to 
"get rid of that marriage thing." (T. 241) She also testified that 
Skeen replied, "Mervin, we can't put everything in her name alone 
because you can die or she can die before you can, so we will put 
the things in both of your names," and Skeen did that (T. 241). 
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On May 30f 1982, Mervin again went into LDS Hospital for 
a fever of unknown origins (T. 100). He remained in LDS Hospital 
until August 2, 1982 (T. 100). On June 2, 1982, Mervin collapsed 
from a blood clot in his lungs which obstructed his circulation (T. 
101-102). Mervin underwent an exceedingly dangerous medical 
procedure called a pulmonary embolectomy (T. 102). This procedure 
has a very high mortality rate (T. 102). He was comatose for two 
to three days (T. 104). He was in the shock-trauma intensive care 
area until approximately June 15, 1982 (T. 104), and he stayed in 
intermediate intensive care from June 15th to July 15, 1982 (T. 
105). 
During Mervin's intensive care stay, Georgia Russell 
visited Ed Skeen's office on June 10th, June 22nd and June 24, 1982 
(T. 326). Mr. Skeen testified that he does not recall the subject 
of the meetings (T. 326). Georgia Russell testified she probably 
went to Skeen's office and asked the status of the preparation of 
a quit-claim deed giving Georgia a joint interest in Mervin's 
property (T. 208) and then requested it to be finished (T. 209). 
Georgia testified that she asked about the deed because 
if Mervin had died before the deed was executed, the antenuptial 
agreement was effective and she would not have gotten the property 
(T. 209). She testified that on May 29th, Mervin told her to "be 
sure to get Ed and to see Ed gets that done for me." (Testimony of 
Georgia Russell, p. 40, hereinafter "T. Russell"). 
Skeen testified that he did not prepare the deed (T. 
313). Louise Chadwick, Ed Skeen's secretary, testified that 
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neither she nor Skeen ordered, requested or prepared the deed (T. 
344). Georgia testified that Skeen left word for the typist to 
prepare the deed (T. 211). An unknown person called and told her 
that the deed was finished (T. 211). The deed had several blanks 
and the property descriptions were listed in a random and haphazard 
way (T. 313). Skeen never would have given a deed in such 
condition to a client (T. 313). Louise Chadwick testified that on 
the basis of notations on the deed, it must have been prepared by 
the law firm word processing pool between 11 p.m. and 3 a.m. on 
the morning of June 25, 1982 (T. 344). 
Georgia picked up the deed on the morning of June 25th 
(T. 211). She did not go to work because executing the deed that 
day was important (T. 211). 
In late afternoon Mervin signed the deed (T. 207 and 213) 
(Addendum 1). The witnesses to the deed's execution were Blaine 
and Judith Russell and Jim and Macell Beverage (T. 212). Upon 
Georgia's request, Louise Chadwick came to the hospital and 
notarized Mervin's and Georgia's signatures (T. 212 and 345). 
Blaine Russell testified that Mervin looked very ill and 
didn't speak (T. 572). Dr. James Orme testified as an expert 
witness that on June 25, 1982, Mervin Russell had the motor 
function to sign his name, but he was not capable of going through 
the thought process and reasoning necessary to execute a deed or 
to have opinions regarding it (T. 108). 
Sometime during that summer, Georgia requested Skeen's 
office to draft some additional witness affidavits of attesting to 
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Mervin1s mental state to accompany the June 25th deed (T. 216 and 
330). Jim and Macell Beverage signed those affidavits (T. 330). 
She requested the deeds because, "Mr. Russell was always great on 
having witnesses to everything." (T. 218). 
On August 2f 1982f Mervin transferred to the University 
Medical Center for physical therapy (T. 121 and 125). While at the 
University, Mervin asked Helen to get Gene and Ed Skeen to the 
hospital immediately (T. 175). He then asked Helen, "Are you up 
to fighting Georgia?" (T. 175). Helen did not answer (T. 175). 
Mervin continued that he had "gotten in too far" before he realized 
what was happening (T. 175). Mervin transferred to Holy Cross 
Hospital on August 13, 1982 (T. 127). 
On August 14, 1982, a cancellation of the antenuptial 
agreement was executed (T. 219) (Addendum 2). Contradicting 
Georgia's testimony that Mervin worried about witnesses and 
notaries, the agreement had neither witness signatures nor was it 
notarized (T. 219). Georgia testified that she called Skeen about 
the agreement the end of May and not in August (T. 237 and T. 
Russell 58). The agreement arrived in the mail (T. 238). 
At this point, Georgia's own testimony is conflicting 
about the circumstances regarding the execution of this agreement. 
However, at trial Georgia testified that she took the agreement to 
Holy Cross Hospital on August 14, 1982 (T. Russell 48). She handed 
Mervin the document and read it to him (T. Russell 50). She laid 
it on his stomach and offered him a pen (T. Russell 50). Mervin 
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requested that she sign his name for him (T. Russell 51). Georgia 
signed Mervin1s name on the top signature line (T. Russell 51), 
Mervin Russell was released from Holy Cross Hospital on 
October 2, 1982 (T. 99). 
On January 24f 1983f Skeen met with Mervin and Georgia 
to execute a second cancellation of the antenuptial agreement (T. 
326) (Addendum 3). Skeen met them behind the Tooele courthouse (T. 
327). Skeen sat in the truck with Mervinf and Georgia sat in 
Skeen's car (T. Russell 65). Mervin signed the document (T. 328). 
Skeen notarized the document (T. 327). The document was 
incorrectly dated for the 25th of January when the actual date was 
January 24, 1983 (T. 327). Skeen testified that it was not 
possible that he would have notarized the document without being 
in the presence of the parties signatory to it (T. 328). Georgia 
signed the agreement after Mervin (T. Russell 66). 
On November 3f 1983f Georgia called Ed Skeen and left a 
message with his secretary, "Did everything the Court's award to 
him solely (that's not divided with Ada) is in his name with 
Georgia as joint tenants only. Not to be divided with Gene." (T. 
348). Louise Chadwick testified that she underscored the word 
"not" because it was emphasized by Georgia (T. 349). Georgia also 
called Skeen on November 3f 1983, and November 10, 1983 (T. 347 and 
348). 
On November 7, 1983, Ed Skeen sent a letter (Addendum 4) 
to Georgia enclosing a draft of a Will in accordance with a 
previous phone conversation (T. 321). The letter also stated, "If 
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there are any changes you may desire, let me know. I will hold 
original for signature the next time you and Mer come to town." (T. 
718f Plaintiff's Exhibit 67). Skeen testified that the cover 
letter to Georgia referred to Mervin's Will (T. 321). Louise 
Chadwick surmised that the referenced Will would be Mervin's (T. 
593). When Mervin was ill, Skeen often sent things to Georgia 
because she was taking care of him (T. 321). 
Georgia, on the other hand, testified that no draft of 
the Will accompanied the letter (T. Russell 70). She claims it 
could have been a draft of her Will (T. Russell 72). She also 
testified that she never called Skeen about the Will (T. 238). 
According to Georgia, all instructions resulted from the May 14f 
1982f meeting with Ed (T. 239). She testified no one gave 
subsequent instructions or advice (T. 242). On the other hand, 
Skeen testified that he followed the Russells' instructions when 
waiting to complete the Will until November 1982 (T. 319). 
On November 9f 1983, Mervin executed a Will (Addendum 5) 
naming Georgia as the sole devisee (T. 319). Skeen prepared an 
original and duplicate original of the Will and arranged to meet 
Mervin and Georgia in a parking lot of his former office building 
(T. 316). At the meeting, Skeen sat in Mervin's truck with him (T. 
587). Tom Parker, a lawyer and tenant in the 400 South office, 
stood alongside the truck (T. 588). Mervin read over the Will in 
the presence of Skeen, Tom Parker and Louise Chadwick (T. 316). 
Mervin first signed the original Will on a witness line 
(T. 589 and 644). Tom Parker pointed out the mistake (T. 644). 
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Mervin then signed on the correct line (T. 644). Because of the 
mistake, Mervin signed the duplicate original Will on the correct 
line only (T. 590). Louise Chadwick notarized the Will (T. 590). 
Several witnesses testified that after Mervin's hospital-
ization, Mervin1s speech was slurred and he did not want to talk 
(T. 179, 502, 529, 573, 611). Helen Russell testified that in 1984 
and 1985, "Mervin was hard to visit with. He didn't want to talk. 
If I asked him a question, he would answer it if he felt like it. 
But he just didn't want to talk. He was so sick, he just didn't 
want to be bothered." (T. 179). 
Like the August 1982 cancellation of the antenuptial 
agreement, Georgia admitted that she signed Mervin's name to a 
January 12, 1984, grazing lease and did not tell anyone that she 
had signed Mervin's name (T. 227). Georgia Russell continued to 
sign Mervin's name on documents after his death. Again, Georgia 
signed Mervin's name to another grazing lease in January 1987 and 
did not notify the lessor that Mervin died in January 1985. 
Mervin Russell died on October 12, 1985 (T. 222). 
In 1986, Gene Russell and Helen Russell contested the 
Will, both cancellations of the antenuptial agreement and the June 
1982 deed on the basis of incompetency and undue influence. After 
a trial in May 1989, a jury found the deed and August 1982 cancel-
lation invalid and the Will and January 1983 cancellation valid. 
On special interrogatories the jury answered that Mervin Russell 
did not have the mental capacity to execute the June 1982 deed and 
the August 1982 cancellation. The jury found that Mervin Russell 
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had the mental capacity to execute the January 1983 cancellation 
and the Will. The jury found that none of the documents were 
procured by the undue influence of Georgia Russell. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court abused its discretion under Rule 403 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence when it forced appellant-contestant 
to stipulate to the facts of its own expert witness. The expert 
witness would have testified that Georgia Russell signed Mervin 
Russell's name to the August cancellation and attempted to disguise 
her handwriting. Over appellant's objections, the Court then 
misstated the stipulation to the jurors. The Court noted its 
mistake but decided that it was harmless error. However, a party 
may set aside a stipulation for good cause shown. Appellant was 
prejudiced when the Court forced him into the stipulation and then 
misstated the stipulation. Appellant was deprived of the full 
weight of its expert witness testimony which would question the 
veracity of Georgia Russell's testimony. 
2. The Court erroneously applied a clear and convincing 
standard of proof on the issue of undue influence on the Will. The 
correct standard should be a preponderance of the evidence. Utah 
has not decided this issue. The courts require substantial proof 
to show undue influence. However, substantial proof is not a clear 
and convincing evidence standard. The standard of proof in undue 
influence on a deed is clear and convincing. It should not be the 
same standard for a Will. Claims of undue influence on Wills and 
deeds are two different actions. Actions to set aside deeds are 
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actions in equity. Actions to contest a Will are actions at law. 
Also, a deed is effective upon delivery, rarely shows undue 
influence on its face, may be relied upon by third parties and have 
a standard of clear and convincing evidence to show incompetence. 
A Will transfers property on an event in the future, must be 
admitted to probate upon notice to all interested parties and 
protects third parties under the probate code. The standard of 
proof is a preponderance of the evidence to show incompetence to 
make a Will. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY REQUIRED THE 
PARTIES TO STIPULATE TO APPELLANT-CONTESTANT'S 
EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY. 
A. The trial court abused its discretion under Rule 403 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The trial judge has wide discretion in his control over 
the examination of a witness. Perkins v. Fitwell Artificial Limb 
Co. , 514 P. 2d 811 (Utah 1973). Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence states: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, 
or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
Exercise of that discretion is not reversible unless the court 
abuses its discretion and prevents a witness from answering a 
proper question on a material matter. Perkins, 514 P.2d at 813; 
Kearney v. Kansas Public Service Co., 665 P.2d 757 (Kan. 1983). 
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Heref the Court abused its discretion when it forced the contestant 
to stipulate away its right to present testimony. 
As his second witness at trial, contestant's counsel, Mr. 
Allredf called Christine Thornburry as an expert witness on 
handwriting. Shortly into her testimony, the trial court 
orchestrated a stipulation of facts in the witness' testimony. 
In a proffer outside of the jury's presence, the court 
and both counsel participated in the following discussion: 
THE COURT: Hold on. Now are you going to— 
Mr. Abies, are you going to contest either of 
those two facts: Either that this document of 
August 14th was not signed by Merv Russell or 
that it was signed by someone attempting to 
disguise their own handwriting? 
MR. ABLES: It was signed by Georgia Russell 
on August 14th, we stipulate to that. And I 
think that question of disguising, I don't 
think that's relevant at all. She has admitted 
she signed it. 
THE COURT: You are not going to— 
MR. ABLES: Let me—Mr. Skeen's deposition— 
I mean this—I don't think you need a real 
swift document examiner for that because he 
handed this same document to Ed Skeen, who is 
about 84 years old; asked him if—in whose 
handwriting it was. He says, "It looks like 
Georgia's to me." 
THE COURT: You aren't going to contest, then, 
that it appears to have been written by someone 
who was disguising their testimony. You won't 
agree to that, right? 
MR. ABLES: I think—well, I don't know whether 
that is relevant or not. 
THE COURT: It is relevant. My question is do 
you agree to it? It is clearly relevant. She 
is going to say looks like someone disguising 
their handwriting. There is no question it is 
relevant. If your objection is relevancy, I 
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will overrule that objection. If you will 
stipulate to that, then she doesn't need to 
testify. So you just say and we can get on 
with it. 
MR. ALLRED: I wonder if I might say one other 
thing, Your Honor. Here's why it is important. 
This comes back to the Rule 30(e) dealing with 
filing of depositions. 
THE COURT: I have already ruled that it is 
important. That's okay. 
MR. ALLRED: That's okay? 
THE COURT: I ruled in your favor on that. You 
don't need to talk me into it. 
I just need to know whether you agree to it, 
Mr. Abies 
MR. ABLES: All right. We will stipulate to 
that. 
(Transcript of Christine Thornburry testimony, pp. 4-6, hereinafter 
"T. Thornburry") Contestant's counsel objected to being forced 
into any stipulation regarding his expert's testimony (T. Thorn-
burry 9) 
The courts have recognized the value of testimony rather 
than a stipulation. "As a general rule, a party may not preclude 
his adversary's offer of proof of admission or stipulation." State 
v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988); see also State v. Florez, 777 
P.2d 452 (Utah 1989). In Bishop, this court followed the rational 
that "[a] cold stipulation can deprive a party of legitimate moral 
force of his evidence, and can never fully substitute for tangible, 
physical evidence or the testimony of witnesses. In most cases, 
a party has the right to present to the jury a picture of the 
events relied upon." Bishop, 753 P. 2d at 475 quoting United States 
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v, Grassi, 602 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 
448 U.S. 902, 100 S.Ct. 3041, 65 L.Ed.2d 1131 (1980). 
Contestant's expert witness provided relevant, if not 
essential, evidence to his case. Her testimony was not subject to 
the exception in Rule 403 excluding relevant evidence if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice. 
In Florez, this court quoted with approval from People 
v. Hills, 532 N.Y.S.2d 269 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988), appeal denied 73 
N.Y.2d 855, 537 N.Y.S.2d 502, 534 N.E.2d 340 (N.Y. 1988): 
The Court in Hills explained that by 
definition, "a stipulation is a voluntary 
agreement between the parties, not a unilateral 
decision of one party forced upon another," and 
that the risks involved in accepting or 
refusing offered stipulations "do not call for 
the involuntary imposition of a particular 
strategy by either the opposing counsel or the 
court." 
Florez, 777 P.2d at 455, quoting Hills, 532 N.Y.W.2d at 273. 
The right to provide relevant testimony is imperative in 
contested will cases since "investigation in regard to undue 
influence must necessarily assume a fairly wide range, especially 
when the will is caused to be drawn by the sole beneficiary." In 
re Goldsberry Estate, 81 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1938). Georgia Russell 
is the sole devisee of the Will. 
B. The trial court misstated the stipulation to the jury. 
Thus, over the objections and reluctance of both parties, 
the Court orchestrated the stipulation. Before the jury returned 
to the courtroom, the Court stated the stipulation again. 
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Okay. In November of 1988—this witness 
examined some documents in November of 1988. 
She gave the opinion to Mr. Allred that the 
August 14th document was not signed by Mervin 
Russell in her opinion. Secondly, that it was 
signed by some other person attempting to 
disguise their own handwriting. That on May 
11th or 12th of 1989 she came to the conclusion 
and indicated to Mr. Allred that the person who 
had signed it was Georgia Russell. And 
secondly that there are two other documents 
which she looked at, one dated January 12th, 
1984—exhibit what? Do you know? 
• * * 
. . .Those documents were signed—were—were 
not signed by Mervin Russell but in her opinion 
they were not signed by someone attempting to 
disguise their handwriting. 
(T. Thornburry 12-13.) 
Appellee's counsel, Mr. Abies, also wanted to stipulate 
that Georgia signed the August 1982 cancellation (T. Thornburry 
14). Contestant's counsel Mr. Allred objected, "I don't think that 
should be part of the stipulation. I think it should show that 
they are stipulating to the testimony as accurate, and not get on 
there to start out making their excuses." (T. Thornburry 14). The 
Court answered, "I guess that's right." (T. Thornburry 14). 
The Court announced the following stipulation to the 
jury: 
The document examiner will testify that she 
examined that document, along with other sample 
signatures, and came to the conclusion that the 
document was not signed by Merv Russell; that 
is, that his name was not signed by him, that 
it was in fact signed by someone who was 
attempting to disguise their own handwriting. 
She came to that conclusion and gave her 
opinion to Mr. Allred in November of 1988. 
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Later, on May 11th or 12th, just 10 or 11 days 
ago, she came to the further conclusion that 
the person who had signed that document was 
Georgia Russell. She gave that opinion to Mr. 
Allred at that time. 
She would also testify that two other 
documents, one dated January 12, 1984, and one 
dated January 26, 1987, which will be marked 
Exhibits 57-A and 60, were also not signed by 
Merv Russell, but the person who signed his 
name on those documents was not in any way 
attempting to disguise their own signature. 
(T. 154) 
The Court then confirmed the stipulation with 
contestant's counsel (T. 154). Contestant's counsel objected to 
the Court's rendition of the stipulation because the stipulation 
was not what the testimony would have been but to the facts 
themselves (T. 154). The following occurred on the record and 
before the jury: 
THE COURT: I believe that is the extent of the 
stipulation; is that right, Mr. Allred. 
MR. ALLRED: I think their agreement was they 
admitted she signed it, admitted it was 
disguised. 
MR. ABLES: No, we didn't do that. 
THE COURT: Wait a minute. 
MR. ABLES: Absolutely not. 
THE COURT: That was the agreement. 
MR. ABLES: No, it wasn't. 
THE COURT: I think—just a minute. Approach 
the bench, please. 
THE COURT: The lawyers agree that would be 
this witness's testimony if she continued to 
testify, and based upon that, the witness has 
been excused. 
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(T. 154-155) 
The Court misstated the stipulation. Before the jury, Mr. Allred 
attempted to correct the Court and Mr. Abies immediately objected 
to such a version of the stipulation. Mr. Abies1 objection gave 
the jury the impression that contestant's counsel was less than 
forthcoming in any representations he made to the jury. 
Later in the trialf contestant's counsel again objected 
to both being required to stipulate and the rendition of the 
stipulation (T. 434). Mr. Allred stated that the stipulation was 
to the facts of the witness1 testimony (T. 435). Mr. Abies argued 
that he only stipulated to the witness1 opinion (T. 435-436). The 
Court then declared: 
THE COURT: Well, this is a problem. I have 
to admit that I kind of messed this up, because 
you stipulated to more than that. You 
stipulated to the fact it was disguised. 
MR. ALLRED: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And if you weren't going to 
stipulate to that, I should have let the expert 
testify, because then it is a contested issue 
and it is a question of credibility, and I 
should have let the jury hear the testimony so 
that they could weigh the testimony of Georgia 
as opposed to the testimony of the document 
examiner. 
The reason I didn't is because I thought that 
you were stipulating that it was a fact, and 
then when we got to the end of the transcript, 
I didn't say that much to the jury. 
(T. 436) 
Mr. Allred requested a jury instruction that the 
stipulation was misstated and that the parties stipulated to the 
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fact that the handwriting was disguised, which was why counsel let 
his witness go (T. 437). Mr. Abies suggested that the Court state 
a new stipulation. The Court ruled that: 
Well, I admit to having made an error in this 
situation, but I think it is a small one and 
I don't think that it takes a lot to—I think 
it is fairly harmless. I don't think it takes 
a lot to solve the problem. I think we will 
leave the stipulation as it is with the 
understanding that Mr. Abies is not going to 
ask questions that would allow Mrs. Russell to 
deny that she disguised the handwriting. 
Then you can argue to the jury we have this 
testimony from the examiner, that it was 
disguised and it is unrefuted, that she didn't 
ever deny it. And I think if you can do that, 
that will solve the problem. 
(T. 438-439) 
However, at this point, the Court should have set aside 
the stipulation. It is a well settled rule that stipulations are 
conclusive and binding on the parties unless upon timely notice and 
for good cause shown, relief is granted therefrom. Higley v. 
McDonald, 685 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah 1984). 
A court can set aside a stipulation for inadvertence, 
justifiable cause, mistake of fact if the mistake is not due to 
failure to exercise due diligence and it could not have been 
avoided by exercise of ordinary care. State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 
1254, 1265 (Utah 1983). A stipulation agreed to in open court can 
also be set aside for the actual absence of consent. In the Matter 
of Marriage of Lorenz, 801 P.2d 893 (Or. App. 1990). Even if the 
court has power to force the parties into a stipulation, the 
21 
parties may move to set aside the stipulation for justifiable 
cause. 
Here, appellant was justified to request that the 
stipulation be set aside. There seems to be no meeting of the 
minds as to what the stipulation was, there was mutual mistake, 
the Court admitted that it had made a mess and since both parties 
were very reluctant, there seems to be an absence of consent. 
C. Appellant was prejudiced by the stipulation. 
The refusal of the Court to allow contestant's witness 
to testify prejudiced appellant. Appellant was deprived of 
presenting the full weight of the evidence of Georgia Russell's 
deviousness. Besides Thornburry's testimony that Georgia attempted 
to disguise her handwriting when she signed Mervin's name on the 
August 1982 cancellation, Georgia's deviousness was illustrated in 
two other incidents. The first incident is when Georgia 
categorically denied any knowledge about Mervin's signature on the 
August cancellation. In March 1988, Georgia Russell was deposed 
on this subject. Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Georgia was entitled to make changes in the deposition within 30 
days. If no changes were made, the deposition is deemed correct. 
However, 14 months later and one day before trial in May 1989, 
Georgia filed a list of corrections to her March 1988 deposition 
(T. 245). She filed her changes, after appellant-contestant 
submitted his trial witness list which included an expert witness 
on handwriting (T. 246). Georgia denied that her changes were a 
result of the witness list (T. 246). 
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In her deposition, Georgia originally testified that she 
could not recall whether she asked Mervin to sign the agreement (T. 
290). She changed her answer to "He asked me to sign it." (T. 
290). Georgia changed her answer because, "I had looked at the 
document and had realized that was the one I signed for him." (T. 
291). 
In her deposition, Georgia acknowledged that the bottom 
signature of Georgia R. Russell was hers (T. 293). She then 
testified that she did not see the signature of Mervin Russell 
applied (T. 293). However, she changed her answer that she knew 
about Mervin1s signature because it was her signature (T. 293). 
Georgia also originally testified that she did not recognize the 
handwriting on the date (T. 293). She changed her answer to "Yes." 
(T. 294). Georgia also originally testified that she did not 
recognize the handwriting and that it was not hers, but then 
changed her answer that she did recognize it because it was her 
handwriting (T. 295). 
The second incident centers around the $5,100.00 loan to 
Mervin and Georgia from Geneil and Gene Russell. In his opening 
statement, Georgia's counsel told the jury that "[a]s a result of 
that sheep operation, Geneil claims she lost $5,000 and that, so 
Georgia went ahead and borrowed money from her credit union and 
paid Geneil's credit union for the money that had been lost due to 
Mr. Russell's mismanagement and misappropriation of the money that 
was paid back to her." (Opening Statement by Mr. Abies, pp. 10-
11) 
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Gene testified that his ex-wife had borrowed $5,100 from 
her father to loan to Mervin so that Mervin would not have to sell 
any cows (T. 691). During Gene's testimony at trial, Mr. Allred 
noticed that the memo line on the check had been x'd out (T. 
Russell 55 and 56) (Addendum 6). After court that day, Mr. Allred 
had the document examiner determine that the x's covered the words 
"Repayment of Loan to Mervin Russell-In Full." (T. Russell 55 and 
56) Once it became apparent that this message was at issue, 
Georgia Russell produced the original, unaltered check on the 
following day at trial (T. Russell 55 and 56). 
Georgia admitted that she saw Mr. Allred examining the 
copy of the check at a break in the trial on the previous day (T. 
Russell 75). In her testimony, Georgia explained that she "Xed" 
the message out because, "I wanted it to be processed through the 
bank so that there would be no further claim that Mer owed any more 
money. So Mer did not want this on there any way and I cannot tell 
you when I 'Xed1 this out. But I was getting real tired of all the 
money. . .that was going out and none coming in." (T. Russell 28) 
On cross-examination, Georgia testified that she brought 
the original check to court that day, May 24th, because her 
interest was piqued because Allred was so interested in that 
particular check (T. Russell 75). Georgia admitted that she had 
the unaltered copy of the check at the time the altered copy was 
entered into evidence (T. Russell 79). Georgia also testified that 
she can't remember Geneil ever loaning her and Mervin $5,100.00 (T. 
Russell 83). Georgia testified that she altered the check not to 
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deceive the court but because she was "getting very, very weary of 
all of the outgo and no income." (T. Russell 85-86). 
Both of these incidents and Georgia's insistence that she 
had no part in executing any of the documents at issue create a 
situation where Christine Thornburry could call into question the 
veracity of Georgia's testimony. To force appellant to stipulate 
away any potential force that oral testimony may have had was 
clearly prejudicial in this case. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED A CLEAR AND 
CONVINCING STANDARD OF PROOF ON THE ISSUE OF 
UNDUE INFLUENCE ON THE WILL. 
In Jury Instruction No. 16f the Court instructed that 
"Gene Russell and Helen Russell have the burden to establish by 
clear and convincing evidence that the same documents were obtained 
through the undue influence of Georgia Russell." The application 
of this standard is an error of law. The correct standard of proof 
should be a preponderance of the evidence. No Utah court has 
decided this issue. 
It is undisputed that in order to create a Will, the 
testator must be able to (1) identify the object of one's bounty 
and know one's relationship to them, (2) recall the nature and 
extent of one's property and (3) form some understandable plan for 
disposition of that property. Matter of Estate of Kesler, 702 P. 2d 
86, 88 (Utah 1985). A contestant must show by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the testator was incompetent to make a Will. Id. 
at 88. See also In re Swans Estate, 293 P.2d 682, 686 (Utah 1956). 
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A party may also contest a Will because another party 
unduly influenced the testator. Undue influence occurs when the 
testator's volition at the time the Will was made was overpowered 
to the extent that he would have done it had he been free from that 
control. In re Lavelle's Estate, 248 P.2d 372, 375-376 (Utah 
1952). In such a case, the Will then represents the desire of the 
person exercising the influence rather than that of the testator. 
_Id. at 376. 
Undue influence must be shown by substantial proof. Id. 
at 378. The courts require substantial proof because "it is not 
usually possible to procure direct evidence of the statements and 
conduct which one accused of undue influence has used on the 
decedent. One of the two is dead; the other cannot be expected to 
give evidence against himself." In re Hanson's Estate, 52 P.2d 
1103, 1110 (Utah 1935). 
Usually, undue influence is surrounded by all possible 
secrecy. In re Estate of Price, 388 N.W.2d 72, 78 (Neb. 1986). 
It is difficult to prove by direct and positive proof and is a 
matter of inferences from facts and circumstances surrounding the 
testator, his life, character, and mental condition and the 
opportunity afforded designing persons for the exercise of improper 
control. Id. 
A contestant may establish undue influence without 
showing any physical coercion or constraint since the influence 
may be subtle and entirely without outward demonstration. 
Nevertheless, competent evidence must show that one accused of 
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undue influence dominated the will of the testator — that the 
testament is in fact and effect the will of the accused and not 
that of the testator. In re Bryan's Estate, 25 P.2d 602, 610 
(1933). 
Appellant does not dispute that the standard in proving 
undue influence on a deed is clear and convincing evidence. 
Although undue influence must be established by substantial proof, 
this does not mean a clear and convincing standard. Baker v. 
Pattee, 684 P.2d 632 (Utah 1984); Peterson v. Carter, 579 P.2d 329, 
330 (Utah 1978). 
Substantial evidence is also required to prove 
incompetency in both deeds and Wills. Turley v. Turley, 649 P. 2d 
434 (Mont. 1982) (substantial evidence needed to set aside deed for 
incompetency); In re Estate of Kesler, 702 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1985). 
Kesler has a preponderance of the evidence standard but still 
requires substantial evidence. Substantial evidence speaks to the 
kind of evidence provided. "There must be an exhibition of more 
than influence or suggestion, there must be substantial proof." 
In re Lavelle's Estate, 248 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah 1952). "The 
evidence may be inherently weak and still be deemed 'substantial1 
and substantial evidence may conflict with other evidence 
presented." Turley, 649 P.2d at 437, citations omitted. 
The courts never interpreted substantial evidence as 
meaning a clear and convincing standard. No reason exists to 
require different standards of proof to testamentary incapacity and 
undue influence. 
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Undue influence strikes at the heart of whether the 
testator can form an understandable plan and follow on his own 
volition. As long as substantial evidence is provided, undue 
influence should carry the same standard of proof as incompetence. 
This court has recognized that the testator may not have lacked 
testamentary capacity but still be easily capable of being 
influenced. In re Hanson's Estate, 52 P.2d 1103, 1117 (Utah 1935). 
Undue influence on a Will should not carry the same 
standard of clear and convincing standard to prove undue influence 
on a deed. The two actions are fundamentally different. 
Deeds are effective upon delivery without notice to third 
parties. (Knesser v. Peterson, 675 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1984).) 
In fact, a deed is invalid if it is executed with no intent to 
transfer a present interest. Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632 (Utah 
1984). Any transfer of a Will becomes effective only at some point 
in the future when the testator dies. Before that death, devisees 
under the Will only have an expectation and not a present interest. 
A deed rarely if ever shows undue influence on its face. 
A proceeding to attack a deed involves one who seeks to obtain a 
judgment which requires another to make restoration either by money 
payment or by doing a positive act. In re Goldsberry's Estate, 81 
P.2d 1106, 1109 (Utah 1938). A Will must be admitted to probate 
after notice to all interested persons. The proceeding to probate 
a Will involves the issue only as to whether the document offered 
is or is not that thing which the law denominates a Will. The 
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notice is for all those who are interested and claim the document 
not to be a Will. Id. 
Third parties may rely on a recorded deed long before the 
parties who are injured by the undue influence learn of the injury. 
The probate code protects the rights of third parties regardless 
of the outcome of the Will contest. See, Utah Code Ann. §75-3-
301 (re: creditor's claims against estate); Utah Code Ann. §75-
3-605 (re: creditor's right to demand bond). 
The standard of proof to attack deeds on grounds of 
incompetency of the transferor is clear and convincing. Baker v. 
Patteef 684 P.2d 632 (Utah 1984); Anderson v. Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 
95 (Utah App. 1988). The standard of proof to contest a Will on 
grounds of lack of capacity is preponderance of the evidence. 
Matter of Estate of Kesler, 702 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1985). 
An attack on a deed is an action in equity. Baker v. 
Pattee, 684 P.2d 632 (Utah 1984); Anderson v. Thomas, 159 P.2d 142 
(Utah 1945). A contest of a Will is an action at law. In re 
Lavelle's Estate, 248 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah 1952); In re Swans's 
Estate, 293 P.2d 682 (Utah 1956). The Nebraska Supreme Court has 
recognized that such a difference bears on the standard of proof 
for undue influence. 
In In re Estate of Price, 388 N.W.2d 72, 77 (Neb. 1986), 
the Court stated, "[t]he reason for the different treatment rests, 
however, not on the nature of the instruments involved, both of 
which are of equal dignity, but in the nature of the causes of 
action involved." _I<3. According to Price, the courts historically 
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have required fraud to be proven in equity cases by clear and 
convincing evidence and to be proven in law actions by a 
preponderance of the evidence. J[cL Claims of undue influence in 
wills and deeds should be accorded the same difference. Thusf the 
Court concluded that the standard of proof for undue influence on 
a Will is the preponderance of the evidence. Id. 
Likewise, actions to set aside deeds and Wills involve 
fundamental differences. The standard of proof for undue influence 
on a Will should not be clear and convincing but rather a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment should be 
reversed in part and the case remanded for new trial to determine 
the validity of the Will and the January 25f 1983, cancellation 
agreement. 
Respectfully submitted this / day of June, 1992. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM ONE 
QUIT CLAIM DEED 
MERVIN J. RUSSELL and GEORGIA J. RUSSELL, his wife, 
grantors, of Ophir, County of Tooele, State of Utah, hereby 
QUIT CLAIM to MERVIN J. RUSSELL and GEORGIA J. RUSSELL, his 
wife, as joint tenants, Grantees, of Ophir, County of Tooele, 
State of Utah, for the sum of Ten and no/100 Dollars, and other 
good and valuable consideration, the following described tracts 
of land in Tooele County, State of Utah: 
East % of Northwest k\ South k of Northeast k of 
Section 8, Twp. 6 South of Range 5 West, S.L.M. 
containing 160 acres; 
ALSO: Northeast k\ East k of Northwest k\ Lots 1 and 2, 
of Section 7, Twp. 7 South of Range 5 West, 
S.L.ti. Cont. 319.76 acres; 
ALSO: The Southeast of Northwest k and lots 2 and 3, of 
Section 31, Twp. 5 South, Range 5 West, S.L.M. 
except a tract of 8 acres com. at the Southeast 
corner of Lot 3, thence North 10 chs; thence West 
8 chs; thence South 10 chs; thence East 8 chs to 
beg. except right of way over 1.39 acres granted 
to State Road Comm. containing 107.73 acres; 
ALSO: West k of Southwest k> Section 17, Twp. 6 South, 
Range 5 West, S.L.M. Cont. 80 acres; 
ALSO: The South k of Section 2, Twp. 5 South, Range 4 
West, S.L.M. Cont. 320 acres. 
ALSO: Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and Northeast k of Section 11, 
twp 5 South of Range 4 West, S.L.M. Cont. 309.47 
Acres. 
Commencing 9.60 chains South <af the Northwest 
corner of Section 29, Township 5 South, Range 5 
West; thence North 81°15' East 20.20 chains; 
thence South 5 chains; thence South 81°15' West 
20.20 chains; thence North 5 chains to the place 
of beginning. 
PARCEL 1: The Southeast quarter of thfe Northwest quarter and 
Lots 2 and 3 of Section 31, Township 5 South, Range 5 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM the following described property: 
Commencing et the Southeast corner of said Lot 3 and running 
Exhibit - F " 
thence West 8 chains; thence North 10 chains; thence East 8 
chains; thence South 10 chains to the point of beginning. 
PARCEL 2: The South half of Section^, Township 5 Southt 
Range 4 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 3: Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and the Northeast quarter of 
Section JLi, Township 5 South, Range 4 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
PARCEL &: The West half of the Northwest quarter; the 
Northwest quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section 23^ 
Township 5 South, Range 4 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 5: The Southeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of 
Section 3J^ , Township 5__iLcuth, Range fL.West, Salt LaKe Base and 
Meridian; the Southwest quarter of the Southwest quarter of 
Section^, Township J? South, Range 4 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; Lots 1 and 2 ana the Southwest quarter of the 
Norrheast quarter of Section _5_, Township 6 South, Range 4 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 6: The Black Shale Lode mining claim, Lot 3029, 
containing 19.945 acres; West Shore, Selma, Sister Mary, West 
Selma, Fcur o'clock, Esther, Alice, Maggie Kelly, Honest Tick, 
Lola Barker and Black Sheep Lode mining claims, Lot No. 3164, 
containing 1S4.22 acres; Douglas No. 1 and Douglas No. 2 lode 
mining claims, Lot No. 3142, containing 26.15 6 acres; Gold 
Button, Buena Vista, Mary Jean No. 1, Mary Jean No. 2 and Mary-
Jean Fraction lode mining claims, Lot No. 3231, containing 
57.127 acres; Hecla, Hecla No. 1, Hecla No. 3, Hecla No. 3, and 
Hecla No. 4 lode mining claims, Lot No. 3079, containing 66.27 
acres; Syndicate No. 1, Syndicate No. 2, Monopolist Nos. 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 lode mining claims, Lot No. 3487, 
containing 107.04 acres; Grannet Mountain lode raining claim, 
Lot No. 3681, Quartet No. 1, Kansas Eoy, Kansas Boy Fraction, 
Kansas Boy No. 2 and Kansas Boy No. 4 lode mining claims, Lor 
No. 3935, containing 80.972 acres; Edna May, Louis No. 1, Louis 
No. 2 and Louis No. 3 lode mining claims, Lot No. 3 3£1, 
containing 68.733 acres; Ivanhoe, Coin, Albion and Try Again 
lode mining claims, Lot No. 4192, containing 64.376 acres; all 
situated in Camp Floyd Mining District, in said County and 
State; also Gold Bug No. 1, Gold Bug No. 3, Gold Bug No. 3 and 
Gold Bug No. 4 lode mining claims, Lot No. 3356, containing 
55.20 acres; and Senator Stewart, Cedar Hill and Dolly Faunce 
lode mining claims, containing 61.921 acres, situated in Ophir 
Mining District in said County and State. 
EXCEPTING land for highway known as Project No. DE-2 situated 
in Louis Claim No. 3 of Mineral Survey No. 3381 in Section _4j 
Township 6 South. Range 4_West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Said tract of land is 100 feet wide, 50 feet on each side of 
the center line of survey of said project. Said center line is 
described as follows: 
Beginning at the intersection of the Southeasterly 
boundary line of said Louis Claim No. 3 and said center line of 
survey at Engineer's Station 773+23, which point is 
approximately 225 feet North 63°20' East along said 
Southeasterly boundary line from thfSouthwest corner of said 
Louis Claim No. 3; thence Northwesterly 243.3 feet along the 
arc of a 1°00' curve to the left (Note: Tangent to said curve 
at its point of beginning bears North 44°09l West) to the 
intersection of said center line of survey at Engineer's 
Station 773*66.3.and a line perpendicular to said center line 
of survey, which-point*is approximately 70 feet North and 
approximately 1383 feet North 46°35' West from the East quarter 
corner of said Section 4, as shown on the official map of said 
project on file in the office of the State Road Commission of 
Utah. Above described tract of land contains 0.56 of an acre, 
of which 0.55 of an acre, more or less, is now occupied by the 
existing highway. Balance 0.01 of an acre, more or less. 
PARCEL 7: Lots 1 and 4 in Block 16 of the St. John Town Pl»*-
PARCEL 8: Lots 4, 5, and 6 in Block 1 of the St. John Pasture 
Plat. 
PAPXEL 9: Beginning at the Southeast corner of the Southwest 
quarter of Secticn 2Si> Township .5,jSauth, Range 5 V/est« Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian; running thence North 9.5 chains; thence 
West 20 chains; thence South 9.5 chains; thence East 20 chains 
to the point of beginning. 
PARCEL 10: Beginning 15.28 chains North of the Southwest 
corner of the Northwest quarter of Section JJ_9, Township £. 
£outh, Range 5 West. Salt Lake Base and Meridian; running 
"thence North clc15' East 20.20 chains; thence North 10.24 
chains; thence South 81°15' West 25.52 chains; thence South 
8°45' East 10 chains; thence North 81°15' East 3.66 chains to 
the point of beginning. 
PARCEL 11: The Northeast quarter; the East half of the 
Northwest quarter, an Lots 1 and 2 of Section^., Township_2 
South, Range 5__West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 12: The East half of the Northwest quarter and the 
South half of the Northeast quarter of Section
 mB_JL Township 6 
^South, Range JLJxest, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; the West half 
"cf the Southwest quarter of Section 17, Township 6 South, Range 
5 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 13: The West half of the Northeast quarter; the South 
half of the Northwest quarter; the West half of the Southeast 
quarter and the SOuthwest quarter of Section_JLZ, Township J£_ 
South, Range 6 West. Salt Lake Base and Meridian; West half of 
the Northeast quarter and Northwest quarter of Section 20 > 
Township 7 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 14: The following described real property in Tooele 
County, State of Utah: The Golden Eagle Lode Mining claim 
described as fellows, to-wit: Mineral patent, Certificate No. 
0638. Survey No. 5841, embracing a portion of Township _5 South 
of Range 4 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, in the Ophir^ 
Mining District in the County of Tooele, State of Utah: 
Beginning at corner No. 1 marked 1-5841, from which U.S. 
Mineral Monument No. 1 bears South 78°53' West 1640.8 feet 
distant; thence first course, South 72°43' East 2 feet 
intersect line 4-5, an East line of Lot No. 162, the Grand 
Gulch Lode Claim; 152.4 feet intersect line 2-3 of Lot No. 
151-B, the Baltic Mill Site Claim, at South 16°40' West 203.1 
feet from corner No. 2; 600 feet to corner No. 2 marked 2-5841, 
from which discovery cut bears North 26°10* West 416.9 feet 
distant; thence, second course. North 19°48' East 1198.3 feet 
intersect line 2-3 of the Kile No. 4, Lode Claim survey No. 
5623 at South 76°55' East 580.8 feet from Corner No. 2; 1500 
feet to corner No. 3, marked 3-5541; thence third course North 
72°43' West 600 feet to corner No. 4 marked 4-5841; thence, 
fourth course, South 19°48' West 248.5 feet intersect line 3-4 
of the Nile No. 3 Lode Claim, Survey No. 5623 and line 1-2 of 
said Nile No. 4 Lode Claim, at North 6°24' East 297,4 feet and 
97.4 feet from comers Nos. 3 and 2 respectively; 545.9 feet 
intersect line 2-3 of said Nile No. 3 Lode Claim, at North 
76°53' West 69.4 feet from corner No. 3; 927.9 feet intersect 
line 2-3 of Survey No. 5535, the Bell No. 3 Lode Claim, at 
North 10° East 103.7 feet from corner No. 2, 1027.3 feet 
intersect line 1-2 of said Survey No. 5535, at North 61° 30' 
West 17.3 feet from Comer No. 2; 1298.2 feet intersect line 
1-2 of said Lot No. 151-B- at North 73° 20' West 141.4 feet from 
corner No. 2; 1494.4 feet intersect said line 4-5 of Lot No. 
162; 1500 feet to corner No. 1, the place of beginning; 
expressly excepting and excluding from these presents all that 
portion of the ground hereinbefore described, embraced in said 
mining claims or Survey No. 5535; said Lots Nos 151-B and 162; 
said Nile No. 3, Nile No. 4, Lode Claims Survey No. 5623 and 
also all that portion of said Golden Eagle vein or lode and of 
all veins, lodes, and ledges throughout their entire depth, the 
tops or apexes of which lie inside of such excluded ground; 
said survey No. 5841, extending 1500 feet in length along the 
Golden Eagle vein or lode; the premises herein granted, 
containing 15.274 acres, more or less. 
All of Lots 6, 7, and 8 and the East 150 feet of Lot 9, Block 
11, the East half of Lot 7, Elock 12, all of Lots 2 to 8 
inclusive, Block 13; all cf Lots 1 to 9 inclusive, Block 14; 
All of Lots 1 tc 9 inclusive, Block 15; all of Lots 2 to 8 
inclusive, Block 17; all of Lots 1 to 9 inclusive, Block 18; 
all of Lots 1 to 10 inclusive, Block 19; all of Block 20; all 
of Lot 9, Block 21, all of Block 22, except Lot 1; all of Block 
23, except the West half of Lots 1, 2, and 3. All Lots and 
blocks described in this paragraph are located in Plat "A"; 
Ophir Survey. Together with all water rights appurtenant to 
the foregoing patented mining claims and other property 
including but net limited to those water rights awarded to 
Annie Worthing and Charles D. Daniels% described in paragraph 
VI in the decree of the District Court of Tooele County, dated 
December 20, 1919 in the case of Cphir Creek Water Company, a 
corporation, plaintiff vs. Ophir Hill Consolidated Mining 
Company, a corporation, defendant. 
PARCEL 15: The Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of 
Section _i£j Township JLJLouth, Range 5 West. Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, excepting road and portion conveyed to Warren and 
Gertrude Penney. 
PARCEL 16: Lots 3, 4, and 5 of Section 4^ Township _10 South, 
Range J^West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 17: Lots 5, 6, 7, and 8 and the Southeast quarter of 
the Southwest quarter of Section^, Township 10 South, Range^i^ 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 18: Beginning at the center of Section Jj6^  Township 5 
South, Range 6 West. Salt Lake Base and Meridian, running 
thence North 298 feet; thence East 1320 feet; thence South 50.5 
feet; thence West 577.5 feet; thence South 247.5 feet; thence 
West 742.5 feet to the point of beginning. 
-4-
PARCEL 19: The North half of Section 12^ Township 5 South, 
Range 5 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 20: The Northwest quarter of Section 14j Township J, 
Soutn, RangeJLWest, Sa*- Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 21: The North half of the Northeast quarter; the 
Soutn half of the Northeast quarter of Section 14. Township 5_ 
South, Range J^Jdsst, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 22: The South half of the Northwest quarter and the 
Northwest quarter cf the Southwest quarter of Section,Jit,. 
Townsnip _6 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 23: Lots 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27 
of Section JiL, Township _4_JLputh, Range _3 West, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian. Lots 4 and 5; the North half of the Northeast 
quarter, the Southeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of 
Section JJL, Township_^ South. Range 3 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; also the Southeast quarter of the Southeast quarter 
of Section 25, Township 4 South, Range 4 West, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian. 
PARCEL 24: The South half of the Southwest quarter of 
Section ^ L2, Township 5 South, Range _5 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
PARCEL 25: The-East half of the Southwest quarter; the 
Soutnwest quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section^ JLLx 
Township J, South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 26: Section 12, Township _5 South, Range A_West, Salt 
Lake 3ase and Merician. 
PARCEL 27: East half of the Northwest quarter; the Northeast 
quarter of the Southwest quarter; Lots 1, 2, and 3 of Section 
IS, Township _5 South, Range 4 West, Salt Lake Ease and Meridian. 
PARCEL 28: Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 and the East half of the West 
half ana the West half of the East half of Section ^7., Township 
_5 South, Pvange 3 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 29: All of Section_2_, Township £__S.outh, Range 4 West 
of tht Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Containing 7017.32 acres, more or less. 
Subject to existing rights of way. 
TOGETHER with the following water rights as more fully 
described in the action entitled Ophir Creek Water Company vs. 
Ophir Hill Consolidated Mining Company, dated December 20, 
1919, in the District Court in and for Tooele County: 
The water rights decreed to Annie Worthing in paragraph VI of 
said decree being a right for 10,000 gallons of water each 24 
hours from the pipeline of Ophir Hill Consolidated Mining 
Company and 25/100 c.f.s. from the natural flow of Ophir Creek 
all for the irrigation of Golden Eagle Lode Mining Claim Survey 
5841. 
ALSO together with all stock water rights used in the operation 
of this livestock unit. 
Hecla, Hecla No. 1, Hecla No. 2, Hecla No. 3 and Hecla No. 4, 
U.S. Survey 3079, containing 66.240 acres, more or less. 
Black Shale, U.S. Survey 3029, containing 19.945 acres, more or 
less . 
Douglas No. 1, U.S. Survey 3142, containing 27.830 acres, more 
or less. 
Buena Vista, Gold Button, Mary Jean No. 1, Mary Jean No. 2, 
Mary Jean Fraction, U.S. Survey 3231, containing 57.127 acres, 
more or less. 
Granite Mountain, (aka Grannet Mt. No. 4.) Quartet No. 1, 
Kansas Boy, Kansas Boy Fraction, Kansas Boy No. 3 and Kansas 
Boy No. 4, U.S. Survey 3661 (should be Survey No. 3935), 80.973 
acres. 
Syndicate No. 1, Syndicate No. 2, U.S. Survey 3487 and 
Monopolist Nos 1 to 8 inclusive, U.S. Survey 3487, containing 
107.40 acres. 
Ivanhoe, Albion, Coin and Try Again, U.S. Survey 4192, 64.376 
acres. 
Vest Shore, Selma, West Selma, Sister Mary, Four O'clock, 
Alice, Esther, Maggie Kelly, Honest Dick, Lola Barker and Black 
Sheep, U.S. Survey 3164, containing 184.27 acres. 
NE% of NE less 3.09 ac. at road Comm. Also 6.91 ac. to 
Warrent & Gertrude Fenney. All in Ser. 15, T. 5 8., R. 5 W. 
Lets 3, 4, 5, Sec. 4, T. 10 S., R. 5 W., S.L.M. cont. 96.58 
acres. 
Lots 5, 6, 7, 8, SE of SV%, Sec 5, T. 10 S. R. 5 W. S.L.E. 
cont. 170.04 acres. 
Beg. at center of Sec. , T. 5 , R. W., 235 ft; E. 
1320 ft.; _ 50% ft. W. 577% ft; S. ft; V. ft; 
to beginning. cont. 4.13 acres. 
W of NE , S% of NW , of SE of Sec. 17, T. 
7 S., R. 6 W., S.L.M. cont. 400 acres. 
W of NE , NW of Sec. 20, T. 7 S., R. 6 W. S.L.M. cont. 
240 acres. 
S% of NW , N of N of Sec. 13, T. 5 S., R. 5 W., S.L.M. 
cont. 240 acres. 
NW of Sec 14, T. 5 S,, R. 5 W., S.L.M. cont. 160 acres. 
N of NE , S. of NE of Sec. 14, T. 5 S., R. 5 W., S.L.M. 
cont. 160 acres. 
SW of NW ; N of SW , Sec. 14, T. 6 S., R. 6 W. , 
cont. 120 acres. 
Lots 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26, & 27. Sec. 30, T. 4 
S., R. 3 W., S.L.M. Lots 4 and 5; NE ; SB NE ; Sec. 
31 T. 4 S., R. 3 W., S.L.M. SE , SE Sec. 25 T. 4 S., R. 
4 W., S.L.M. Con. in all 546.30 acres. 
S of NE , Sec. 13, T. 5 S.f R. 5 W. , SL.M. cont. acres. 
Sh of S , Sec. 12f T. 3 S., R. 5 W., S.L.M. cont. 80 acres. 
of SW , SW of SW Sec. 11, T. 5 S., R. 5 W., S.L.M. 
cont. 120 acres. 
All of Sec. 12, T. 5 S., R. 4 W. , S.L.M. cent. 640 acres. 
E of NV_ NE of SW , Lots 1, 2 , 3 , Sec. 18, T. 5 S. , R. 4 U\ , 
S7T.M. cont. 227.37 acres. 
Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, , E of W%, W of E of Sec. 7, T. 5 S., R. 
3 V., S.L.M. cont. 502772 acres. 
Commencing 9.60 chains South of the Northwest corner of Section 29, 
Township 5 South, Range 5 West; thence North 81°15' East 20.20 
chains; thence South 5 chains; thence South 81°15' West 20.20 chains; 
thence North 5 chains to the place of beginning. 
South % of Section 35, Township 4 South, Range 4 West, Salt Lake Ease 
and Meridian, and the South % of Section 34, Township 4 South, Range 
4 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
East % of Northwest k, Northeast k of Southwest k, Lots 1, 2, 3, 
Section 18, Township 5 South, Range 4 West, Salt Lake Meridian. Con-
taining 240.37 acres. 
All cf Section 12, Township 5 South, Range 4 West. Containing 640 
acres. 
WITNESS the hands of said grantors this 25th day of June, 1982. 
ME3.VIK' J . ' KuJi^IZ 
Signed in the presence of: 
O 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. : 
County of Salt Lake) 
On the 25th day of June, 1982, personally appeared before 
me MERVIN J. RUSSELL and GEORGIA J. RUSSELL, his wife, the signers 
of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they 
executed the same. 
~ N o t a r y P u D i i c / - 7 ^ N o t a r y 
My 'Commission Expires: Residing at: rly Commis  A ^ 
ADDENDUM TWO 
AGREEMENT CANCELING ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT, by and between MERVIN J. RUSSELL and 
GEORGIA R. RUSSELL, 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS on or about the 11th day of January, 1972, 
the parties hereto entered into an Antenuptial Agreement, in 
writing, a copy of which is attached; and 
WHEREAS the parties desire to terminate subject agree-
ment ; 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is agreed that said Antenuptial 
Agreement is hereby terminated. 
DATED this / £f -—fey of August, 1982. 
~*±K^fiit*4€dS ^ 
GEORGIA R. RUSSELL 
Attachment 
LAW OFFICE OF 
VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL A MCCARTHY 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
SUITE 1600 SO SCUTH MAIN STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 8 4 1 4 4 
ADDENDUM THREE 
AGREEMENT CANCELING ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT, by and between MERVIN J. RUSSELL and 
GEORGIA R. RUSSELL, 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS on or about the 11th day of January, 1972, 
the parties hereto entered into an Antenuptial Agreement, in 
writing, a copy of which is attached; and 
WHEREAS the parties desire to terminate subject agree-
ment; 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is agreed that said Antenuptial 
Agreement is hereby terminated. 
DATED this / ' day of August, 1982. 
gfe-^a-L^^ 
1 •""> 
GEORGIA R. RUSSELL 
Attachment 
State of Utah ) 
) ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
On the 25th day of January, 1983, personally appeared before 
me MERVIN J. RUSSELL and GEORGIA R, RUSSELL, his wife, the signers 
of the above instrument who duly acknowledged to me that they 
executed the same. 
E. J. ^ KEEN 
My Commission Expires: Residing In: 
i 
? J " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ VANCOTT 8AGLEY CORNWALL & M'CARTHY 
P L A I N T I F F S I . r . o r f ^ s . O N M C O . . O M . ON 
E X H I B I T I SUITC moo * C T I « ' M M » N ««Bf rr 
_^ J I SALTLAKf iT> U U H D 4 U 4 
I i EXHIBIT I I! >ur I 
NARO J I t W l S 
ID C SALISBURY 
kNT M * C f * « L A N t . 
B LEWIS 
SCOTT WOODLAND 
• MAN S J O H N S O N 
10 L- GILLETTE 
HARD K SAGEH 
FMEN O SWINDLE 
1ERT D MERRILL 
HARD H STAHLE 
N r HCCMAM 
NT J GIAUOUE 
>COTT SAVAGE 
(NIS B fARRAR 
US W A N G S G A R O 
IN S PIRHMAM 
NCTH W YCATCS 
ID l_ COOK 
J O M N A S N O W 
DAVIO A GWCCNWOOD 
MAXILIAN A TARBMAN 
ARTHUR B RALPH 
BRENT M STEVENSON 
ALAN L SULLIVAN 
ROBERT K ROGERS 
J RAND HIRSCHI 
ROBERT A PETERSON 
JAMES A H O U K A M P 
J KEITH AOAMS 
WILLIAM B WRAY JR 
PATRICK A SHEA 
PHILLIP WM LEAR 
THOMAS T BILLINGS 
RlCHARO C SKEEN 
DANNY C KELLY 
STCVEN D WOODLAND 
THOMAS A ELLISON 
L A W O F F I C E S O F 
V A N COTT, B A G L E Y , C O R N W A L L & M C C A R T H Y 
A P R O F E S S I O N A L CORPORATION 
S U I T E 1 6 0 0 
S O S O U T H M A I N S T R E E T 
S A L T L A K E C I T Y , U T A H S-4-I4-A 
T E L E P H O N E ( S O I ) 5 3 2 - 3 3 3 3 
T E L E X 4 5 3 1 4 9 
A D D R E S S A L L C O R R E S P O N D E N C E T O 
P O S T O F F I C E B O X 3 4 0 0 
8 4 1 1 0 - 3 4 0 0 
BENNETT HARHNCSS L KIRKPATRITK 
1874 I690 
BENNETT MARSHALL & BRAOLEY 
1 8 B 0 i e e e 
BENNETT HARDNESS HOWAT 
SUTHERLAND S, VAN COTT 
tsae toot 
SUTMCHLANO VAN COTT & ALLISON 
1902 1907 
VAN COTT ALLISON & RITCR. 
1907 1917 
VAN COTT RITER 4 FARNSWOnTH 
1917 1947 
ARO I J O H N S O N H RONALD G M O r r i T T 
• UCL O GAU»"IN 
mCHACL KCLLCR 
COTT LONOBERG 
GORY K ORMC 
TREY E NCLSON 
RICIA M LCITH 
C CAHCY 
ID J J O R D A N 
I N R M O L M C S 
HACL N EMERY 
NT D CHRISTENSCN 
.TEPHEN MARSHALL 
IL M DURHAM 
JGLAS L DAV1ES 
CLUABCTH A WMITSCTT 
J PETCR MULMCRN 
JCANNC BRYAN INOUYE 
JOMN N OWENS 
S DAVID COLTON 
PATRICK J O HARA 
TERESA SILCOX 
ROBERT B LCNCE 
MATTHEW F MCNULTY H I 
NANCY J HARPER 
LAWRENCC S S K i r r i N G T O N 
JAMES W STEWART 
S ROBCRT BRAOLCY 
M CATHERINE CALDWELL 
November 7, 1983 
or COUNSCL 
curroRO L- ASHTON 
GEORGE M MCMILLAN 
COWIN J SKCEN 
JOHN CRAWfORD 
JAMES U JENSEN 
Mrs. Georgia Russell 
R.D. No. 8 
Ophir, Utah 84071 
Dear Georgia: 
I am enclosing a draft of a Will in accordance 
with our telephone conversation of Friday ana today. In 
the event there is any property that has not been put into 
joint tenancy, we can handle it through this instrument. 
If there are any additions, corrections, or changes that 
you desire be made, please let me Tcnow. Otherwise, I will 
hold the original for signature the next time you and Mer 
come to town. 
Respectfully, 
EJS:lc 
Enclosure 
E. J. SKEEN 
ADDENDUM FIVE 
VAN COTT, BACLEY, CORNWALL L McCARTHY 
E . J . SKEEN 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Post Office Box 3^00 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400 
Telephone: 532-3333 
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
OF 
MERVIN J. RUSSELL 
I, MERVIN J. RUSSELL, being of sound mind, hereby make 
the following Will which shall replace any and all previous Wills 
or Codicils thereto. 
I. 
I nominate and appoint my wife, GEORGIA J. RUSSELL, as 
my personal representative and authorize her to serve without bone 
or other security for the faithful performance of her duties. 
II. 
I direct that my Personal Representative shall pay all 
of my just debts, expenses of last illness, and funeral expenses 
out of any funds on hand. 
III. 
I give and bequeath to my son, GENE J. RUSSELL, the sum 
of Five Dollars ($5.00), and I give and bequeath to my daughter, 
HELEN GREEN, the sum of Five Dollars ($5.00). I give and bequeath 
all of my property, real, personal, and mixed, wherever located, 
to my wife, GEORGIA J. RUSSELL. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I sign my name to this Last Will anc 
Testament on this day of November, 1983, at Salt Lake Citj 
Utah; and being first duly sworn, do hereby declare to the under-
signed Notary that I sign and execute this instrument as my Last 
Will and Testament and that I sign it willingly, that I execute it 
L A * OFFICE Or 
VAN COTT BAGLCY. CORNWALL * MCCARTHY 
A M O F C H I O N A l CO«*0«A1lON 
t U l T t ISOO SO tCUTH MAIM ftlMCt T 
SALT LAKE CITY U U H I 4 I 4 4 
as iry free and voluntary act for the purposes expressed in it, 
that I am 18 years of age or older, of sound mind and under no 
constraint or undue influence. 
EZRVlN J. RUSSELL, Testator 
The foregoing instrument, consisting of this and one 
other typewritten page, was on the date last above written by the 
said MERVIN J. RUSSELL, the above named testator, signed, sealed, 
published and declared to be his Last Will and Testament m the 
presence of us, who thereupon at his request and in his presence 
and in the presence of each other, subscribed our names as wit-
nesses thereto the day and year last above written. 
<-<^ >rS 
Residing at: 
'- r ' / - t f r sa^ 
-'/* iv 
<, . . / / . 1/A.K s 
Residing at. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss . : 
County of Salt Lake) 
J>*^oj~~£aJ^-JL O ^ LV&£ 
Subscribed, sworn to, and acknowledged before me by the 
testator and by the witnesses named herein en this ^/f ^  rJ\ day of 
November, 1983. 
Mjr Commission Expires: Residing at: Salt Lake County 
t 
LAW ornct or 
VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL * MCCARTHY 
A f « O f I I H O N » l CO»fOP.*1lON 
* W l t l ItOO »0 ICUTH MAi*. ftTMtt 1 
S A L T L A H f CITY U T A H I 4 U 4 
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en 
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2& -*gt3«ca>c^^^>fattT<? --» r^t*-cisr* -> g < u r t , i x g ^ O 
MERVIN J. OR GEORGIA R. RUSSELL 
RFD 8 p***-t-**<4*um*4 *m > * m> ,*-
OPHIR, UTAH 84071 
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DOLLARS 
Walker Bank 
N O f I AND TRUST COMPANY . , 
, • • • I REDWOOD NORTH TEMPLE OFFICE '
 y 
1625 WEST NORTH TEMPLE- SALT U\KE CITY, UTAH 841 1 ? ^ A N ^ C > - ^ 
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